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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A KALEIDOSCOPIC VIEW OF THE PROBLEMS
CONFRONTING FEDERAL COURTS
JAMES L. UNDERWOOD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Several themes have echoed throughout this Symposium.
These themes focus upon the problems that confront contemporary federal courts in a complex modern society-problems that
often find their roots in the past and cast shadows into the future. In my summary and conclusions, I will focus upon several
issues that have been pivotal in our discussions, as well as several other troubling dilemmas confronting the federal court
system.
My remarks will cover the following elements:
(1) Problems confronting the federal trial courts, including:
(a) the jury as fact finder in complex, prolonged cases;
(b) the shift in the center of gravity of contemporary litigation from the trial to the pretrial discovery phase;
(c) the need to develop, and the problems that accompany
the development of, mass joinder devices, such as interpleader
and class actions, as means to reduce the workload of federal
trial courts;
(d) the use and misuse of the courts' ability to control
their own workload by stricter interpretation of article III case
or controversy requirements (standing, ripeness, and mootness
doctrines), and the expanding use of immunities doctrines in
civil rights cases;
(e) the efficacy of methods of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration, insurance cost-shifting measures, or
* Thurmond Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B.,
1959; J.D., 1962, Emory University; LL.M., 1966, Yale University. This is an edited and
enlarged version of remarks made by Professor Underwood at the Symposium. Special
thanks should be given to Professor Robert M. Wilcox of the University of South Carolina School of Law for his much-appreciated advice in the preparation of this
manuscript.
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administrative proceedings; and
(f) the feasibility of deflecting portions of the federal court
workload to the state courts through such means as the narrowing of diversity jurisdiction, increasing the jurisdictional
amount, encouraging the litigation of civil rights disputes in
state forums, and curbing prolonged review of state criminal
proceedings in federal habeas corpus hearings.
(2) Problems confronting the courts of appeals, including:
(a) the increasingly summary nature of many appellate
proceedings in which workload pressure too often forces appellate tribunals to forego full arguments and written opinions;
(b) the need to resolve the growing number of intercircuit
and intracircuit conflicts that give rise to the problems of uncertainty in the law and blatant forum shopping;
(c) the increasing difficulty of generalist judges, no matter
how brilliant, in dealing with complex, esoteric specialties, such
as tax, antitrust, and securities law. An examination will be
made of proposals for the development of specialized subject
matter courts of appeals as a means of resolving intercircuit
conflicts and enabling judges to develop deeper knowledge of
arcane but important technical bodies of law. The opponents
of such tribunals contend that the use of courts with narrow
jurisdiction would create isolated enclaves of law that might be
incompatible with the mainstream of legal thought;
(d) the question of whether the courts are interpreting the
interlocutory appeals statutes too permissively; and
(e) the proposals to abolish the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.
(3) Issues confronting the Supreme Court, including:
(a) the proposal that a National Court of Appeals be created to increase the national appellate capacity of the federal
judicial system;
(b) the desirability of eliminating the remaining
mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
positive and negative consequences of allowing the Court total
control over its own docket; and
(c) the controversies concerning the independence of the
Surpeme Court in reviewing the constitutionality of legislative
action. This discussion will include the debate concerning
whether Congress has the power to delete major categories of
cases from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Should such alterations in jurisdiction be viewed as legitimate exercises of Con-
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gress' article III, section 2 power' to delineate the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction or as illicit attacks upon the judiciary's impartiality and independence?
Inextricably entwined with and exacerbating all of these
problems and issues is the increasingly litigious nature of our
society, which Professor Howard so cogently described. He indicated to us that through a combination of events, including
growth in population, in complexity of economy, and in the regulatory scheme of government, more and more cases of greater
difficulty are being brought. In addition to the reasons he gave
for the increase in litigation, we should note the vigorous use of
the fourteenth amendment, which applies national standards of
justice to the states. This amendment made possible new federal
causes of action. When it was combined with the creation of exceptions to the eleventh amendment ban against using federal
courts for suits against states, extensive new vistas were opened
for suits against state and local officials. In Ex parte Young 2 the
Court held that suits seeking prospective relief against state officials for violating federal constitutional standards are permissible because the official who acts unconstitutionally is stripped of
his connection to the state. Thus, the suit is against the official
rather than the entity.' Through this device, federal courts became the major jousting ground for testing the legitimacy of
state and local government actions.
Also, statutory reasons underlie the development of increased litigation involving constitutional rights. These include
the 1976 Attorney's Fee Award Act, which grants attorney's fees
to the prevailing party in civil rights cases, thus encouraging fil4
ing suit.

1. U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.

2. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

3. But see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (refusing to expand the stripping doctrine to permit suit in federal court against state officials

and state agencies when the basis of the injunction was an alleged violation of state law
rather than the need to vindicate federal constitutional standards).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Su-

preme Court concluded that in order to be a prevailing party and be qualified to receive
attorneys' fees, a litigant in a multiple claims case need not win on all of the issues. The

award, however, should not include compensation for work on unsuccessful claims unless
they are firmly linked to the claims on which the party seeking fees was victorious. These
relatively liberal attorney's fee award standards should serve as a powerful incentive to
litigation.
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Many of the factors that have resulted in increased litigation are positive developments when looked at from a vantage
point other than judicial economy. They increase equal justice
and accessibility to the courts and encourage people to bring
cases that are needed to monitor government conduct. They do
bring in their wake, however, court congestion and retardation
of the pace of government operations as officials pause to defend
themselves in court. We have to deal with this avalanche in a
way that does not compromise the essential even-handedness of
our judicial system.
These problems form the agenda for my review of the Symposium. Now, we must more closely examine the topography of
each item.
II.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS

The shock waves of the increase in litigation will be most
acutely felt at the trial level. We should not forget because of
our fascination with the appellate system, that the heavy and
complex caseload that confronts the higher courts also confronts
the trial level.
A fast-paced economy, sprawling government, and modern
science have combined to produce protracted, multiparty cases
with convoluted issues. Such cases strain the jury system to the
limit. Scholars and practical lawyers have often raised the question of whether the seventh amendment right to a jury trial can
survive that kind of prolonged, highly technical case.5 Recent
cases have questioned whether the due process clause entitlement to have a competent fact finder compels a complex case
exception to the seventh amendment right of jury trial.6
5. See Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497, 527 n.87
(1980). Kirkham quotes Roscoe Pound who said: "[T]he notion that anyone is competent
to adjudicate the intricate controversies of a modern community contributes to the unsatisfactory administration of justice in many parts of the United States." Pound, The
Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv.
729, 735 (1906). For additional references to this issue, see authority cited in C. WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 615 n.45 (1983), including Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex
Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Loo, A Rationalefor an
Exception to the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 30 CLEV. ST. L REv. 647
(1981); and Comment, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CoNN. L. REv. 775 (1978).
6. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (in
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Methods for adapting trial by jury to the challenges of complex cases are being examined. Special verdict forms and careful
judicial instructions can increase the competency of the average
jury. In addition, we have begun to develop ideas of alternatives
to the classic tradition of juries of ordinary people taken from
the general population. One such alternative would utilize juries
comprised of experts or people with unusual abilities to analyze
certain types of facts. These ideas, however, give rise to many
questions, including: (1) Would such an elite body constitute a
jury of the litigants' peers?7 (2) Would use of such carefully selected juries raise questions about jury-rigging that could produce a loss of impartiality? (3) Would the ordinary citizen's
sense of participation in and confidence in the jury system be
diluted?
Another trial level problem is the shift in the center of gravity of litigation away from the trial itself toward the pretrial
stage dominated by discovery maneuvers. Such ploys often are
carried out in a rambunctious, wide-open, unregulated fashion in
which the attorneys attempt to dominate rather than the judge.
Courts are beginning to bring these practices under control
through tighter certification requirements, which make attorneys
attest to the reasonableness of discovery activities, motions, and
pleadings. In addition, as Judge Motley noted, tighter pretrial
conference control by judges, including the setting of discovery
schedules, stymies the use of discovery as a stalling tactic.8 Still,

cases of unusual complexity, due process right to a fair fact-finding method might take
precedence over right to jury trial). But see In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting complex case exception); Cotton v. Wites, 651 F.2d 274, 276
(5th Cir. 1981) (expressing reluctance to adopt complex case exception). In a provocative
footnote in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the Supreme Court noted that the
right to trial by jury in civil cases depends upon the following: "[F]irst, the pre-merger
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and
possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply." Id. at 538
n.10 (citing James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963)); see
C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 615.

7. Kirkham argues that the "systematic exclusion of segments of the community is a
denial of due process since it deprives the parties of a representative cross-section of the
community." Kirkham, supra note 5, at 528 n.88 (citations omitted).
8. For the standards governing certification requirements, see FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 11,
26(g). For provisions mandating tighter judicial control of discovery scheduling, see FED.
R Civ. P. 16(b). See also J. UNDERWOOD, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL DIscovERY RULES 6-12
(1985).
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the basic question remains: is the center of gravity of litigation
shifting so much from the trial stage to a less-regulated pretrial
stage that the accuracy of the fact finding process is
compromised?
Judicial control over promiscuous pretrial activity must be
exerted. It must be realized, however, that carried to the extreme such control exacts a heavy price. Strict certification standards and rigid pretrial schedules may stifle innovation in developing novel but sound theories for redressing wrongs. In
attempting to reduce the workload, moreover, we actually might
be increasing it by creating new areas of satellite litigation in the
form of hearings on the accuracy and reasonableness of an attorney's certification. Such disputes over attorney ethics are important, but fascination with them will not necessarily tell us more
about the merits of the case and may form the basis of a new
form of dilatory tactic.
The increasingly specialized, technological nature of our society has changed the identity of the leading players on the litigation stage. The role of the expert witness was once peripheral;
it is now pivotal. This is especially true in mass litigation in
which the individual litigant is nearly a faceless anonymity, but
the expert plays an increasingly dominant, visible role.
We attribute various oracular powers to these experts. They
seem to speak with a direct line to God. Consequently, trials
often become battles of experts with directly conflicting testimony. Can we find juries that are able to sift amongst such complex cross-currents, even when guided by the most informative
instructions from the judges?' Perhaps we should develop
tighter rules concerning the relevancy of expert testimony and
the degree of weight it should carry in jury deliberations."0

For an example of judicial attempts to thwart abusive and duplicative discovery, see
Hayes v. National Gypsum Co., 38 F.R. Serv. 2d 645 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (requiring defense
counsel to pay reasonable expenses incurred by plaintiffs because of duplicative discovery motions by defendant).
9. See C. MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE 44 (3d ed. 1984).
10. FED. R. EVID. 702 permits the testimony of a person with "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence." The problem arises when the expert's testimony becomes such a comprehensive
packaging of the facts that it usurps the role of the jury. See G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE 392 (1978). Perhaps closer pretrial conference assessment of an
expert's testimony would be in order.
Another approach to the battle of experts problem is permitting a judge to appoint a
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Those are some of the problems that are confronting the
trial stage. What research management and workload control devices are available for coping with this parade of horribles?
Earlier in this Symposium, Professor Wechsler mentioned
the need for long range comprehensive research rather than the
episodic reactions that we tend to get out of Congress, state legislatures, and various special study committees. A research, policy-suggesting agency similar to Judge Cardozo's proposal for a
Ministry of Justice,11 could make comprehensive recommendations concerning which problems of society should be dealt with
12
in the courts, which issues should be dealt with in arbitration
or administrative bodies, which problems should be dealt with in
state courts, and which should be dealt with in federal courts.
For example, do we need federal court adjudication of truth in
lending controversies?13 Do we need adjudication in a court sys-

more neutral court expert under authority of rule 702. One difficulty with this approach,
however, is that the expert's status as court appointed may cloak him with such an aura
of infallibility that the expert may impinge upon the role of the jury. See R. MCCUL.OUGH & J. UNDERWOOD, CIVL TRIAL MANuAL 2 410-14 (1980).
11. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1922).
12. Former Chief Justice Burger has suggested that complex commercial cases are
especially appropriate for arbitration. He noted that "[a] skilled arbitrator ... can digest evidence at his own time and pace without the expensive panoply of the judicial
process." See Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Am. Bar Ass'n Midyear Meeting (Jan. 24, 1982), reprintedin Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.BA J. 274, 277 (1982).
He further observed that commercial arbitration is more conducive to stipulations concerning the discovery process. He recommends that arbitrations voluntarily entered into
be binding on the parties. Id. But see Lay, A Blueprint for Judicial Management, 17
CREIGHTON L. Rlv. 1047 (1984). Lay questions the contention that arbitration is less
expensive and faster than classic trial court adjudication. He also notes that
arbitration fails to provide equitable relief, such as issuance of injunctions, nor
does it afford other remedial powers inherent in the judicial process such as
the use of contempt to enforce its decrees. The rights of third parties often
involved in private disputes, are not considered in arbitration. Moreover, the
selection of arbitrators in given disputes is often based upon prior favorable
results from the same arbitrators.
Id. at 1052-53.
13. For jurisdiction and procedure in consumer credit disclosure cases, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640 (1982). Section 1640(e) allows truth in lending actions to be litigated in federal
district courts or any other courts of competent jurisdiction, including state courts. Is
concurrent jurisdiction necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act? An examination of
the substantive provisions of the act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1639 (1982), reveals that disputes
with regard to such transactions are likely to concern the kind of contract and accounting questions at which state courts are quite expert. A new system could be enacted
under which federal law could provide a uniform standard, and state courts could perform the adjudication in most cases, thus freeing federal courts to concentrate on cases
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tern at all? Suggestions have been made by Judge Motley that
we develop a system of insurance compensation in the toxic tort
area in which such a multitude of injuries may arise out of a
single event or a series of related events that they may be impos14
sible to redress in any one or even a coherent series of cases.
Once a panel to comprehensively study these questions is
convened, then perhaps we can address the procedural and jurisdictional details more intelligently. I would suggest that the following analytical factors should be kept in mind when alternatives to adjudicative dispute resolution such as arbitration,
administrative proceedings, or government-sponsored insurance
compensation are considered: (1) Would such systems in fact be
faster and less costly than court proceedings? (2) Would the
cases being considered for resolution by such a system be appropriate for determination by a private or bureaucratic decisionmaker who does not command the tradition and stature of a
judge? (3) Are they cases in which judicial enforcement power
should be available immediately through the contempt authority
rather than later through a suit to enforce the arbitration or administrative results? (4) Are such cases likely to involve constitutional or public policy issues that defy solution by a private or
low-level government decisionmaker?
During the course of this Symposium several concrete solutions have been suggested for reducing and managing more efficiently the workload confronting the federal court system. The
perennial controversy over the proper scope of diversity jurisdiction was debated. One view is that diversity jurisdiction should
be abolished entirely or curtailed drastically.1 5 Serious consider-

in which a greater need for knowledge of basic federal policy or need for an impartial
forum exists.
14. See Motley, supra p. 545. Models that may be adaptable to the toxic tort area
are already in operation. In New Zealand accident victims are barred from bringing court
actions for their injuries, but instead apply to a government accident compensation corporation for medical, rehabilitative, funeral, and income replacement expenses. See
Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 976, 982-83 (1985) (description of New Zealand plan). Perhaps such a system is
adaptable to toxic torts in this country. Even if you assume, however, that such a system
would not destroy the deterrence of accidents effect that may be attributed to tort suits,
it does raise questions concerning the indirect cost of such a system in denying citizen
participation in the compensation system through jury service.
15. See, e.g., Lectures delivered by Judge Henry J. Friendly, Columbia Carpentier
Lectures, Columbia University School of Law, reprintedin H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 149-50 (1973) [hereinafter H. FRIENDLY] (retain diversity juris-
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ation should be given to reducing diversity jurisdiction by limiting it to situations in which there is a real need for a neutral
forum, such as cases in which a citizen of the forum state, someone with the so-called local boy advantage, is opposed by a citizen of another state who, in theory, may be subject to prejudice
in state courts for being an outsider. 6
On the other hand, it may be appropriate to increase diversity jurisdiction in the area of mass litigation when a single state
court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a significant proportion of the litigants. 1 7 We have a model for that in the statutory interpleader procedure, which uses the minimal diversity
rather than the complete diversity standard.'5
We have vigorously debated the need for mass joinder devices. The desire to achieve judicial economy must be balanced

diction only when suit between citizen and foreign state or citizen and foreign state citizen or when suit is under statutory interpleader procedure); Bartels, Recent Expansion
in Federal Jurisdiction:A Call for Restraint, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219 (1981); Butler,
Diversity in the Court System: Let's Abolish It, 3 ADELPH. L.J. 51 (1984); Griswold,
Helping the Supreme Court by Reducing the Flow of Cases into the Courts of Appeals,
67 JUDICATURE 58 (1983); see also Meador, supra p. 459; Wechsler, supra p. 557; Wright,
supra p. 478.
16. Limiting diversity jurisdiction in this way would be consistent with the original
statutory dimensions of diversity jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 stated:
The circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of
the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five
hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien
is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another state.
Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. The United States Code, at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), does not
require that the suit be between a citizen of the forum state and an "outsider" as a per
se indicia of the need for a neutral federal forum. Complete diversity of citizenship between the two sides is sufficient even if neither has the "home court" advantage.
Judge Henry Friendly suggested that diversity jurisdiction be confined to disputes
between "a citizen and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof" and statutory interpleader actions. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 15, at 149-50. For a discussion of various
proposals for alteration of diversity jurisdiction, see 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3601 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER].

17. The American Law Institute proposed that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the several defendants who are necessary for
a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process of any one
territorial jurisdiction." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, § 2371(a), at 67-68 (1969).
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982); see also State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
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against the cost incurred in the loss of individual litigant autonomy. The judicial landscape is littered with fragments of litigation-seemingly discordant pieces that are broken into separate
cases-which, because of common issues of law or fact, could efficiently be combined in one proceeding. The procedural and jurisdictional machinery for gathering these cases together often is
too limited in scope. One of the examples mentioned several
times in this Symposium is the multidistrict venue provision
that was adopted in 1968.1' This device permits the federal
courts through the multidistrict panel to transfer numerous
cases with common questions of fact into one district for consolidated pretrial discovery, thus preventing different parties from
utilizing the same document or the same witness in ways that
are not compatible. Dean Cooper suggested that this multidistrict transfer system be expanded to permit more ready consolidation of the same cases for plenary trial purposes and not just
for pretrial discovery.20 This suggestion has considerable merit.
Dean Cooper pointed out, however, that before the system can
be expanded, the venue and choice of law problems that often
arise in mass litigation cases must be resolved. 2 '
In diversity cases in which state substantive law governs,
federal courts normally must apply the law that would be used
in the courts of the forum state,22 including that state's choice of
law rule. 23 The applicable law after venue is transferred is nor-

mally that which the transferor court would have applied prior
to transfer.2 Transferee courts in multidistrict consolidations
for full trial purposes are confronted with the question of
whether any uniform substantive law can be applied to all the
consolidated cases or whether each claim is governed by inde-

19. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). See the discussion of the operation of this system in J.
UNDERWOOD, supra note 8, at 263-70.
20. See Cooper, supra p. 516; see also Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, TransferorCourts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 581 (1978). But see
Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Cases, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 804
(1985) (arguing that although numerous cases have affirmed the right of the transferee
judge to retain cases sent to him under a § 1407 order for plenary trial, such a practice is
contrary to the wording and legislative history of § 1407, which permits transfer to

achieve coordinated pretrial activity only).
21. See Cooper, supra pp. 515-18.

22. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

24. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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pendent state law. If the court can apply a uniform rule of law,
the court must then resolve whether it is the law of the state
having the most significant contacts with acts of a common defendant or a uniform federal standard. 5 If a uniform substan-

25. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co, 213 U.S- 487 (1941), and Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), have implications concerning the choice of law problems in
28 U.S.C. § 1407 procedure. Even if that provision is interpreted to permit consolidation
of numerous multidistrict cases for trial, the law used in each consolidated case would
vary according to the law applied in the state courts in each transferor district. The
transferee judge, therefore, would be confronted with a confusing welter of law from several states to apply. In Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167 (1985), however,
the author suggests that federal common law could be developed to provide a uniform
rule that could be applied to all of the consolidated cases if no transferor forum state has
an interest paramount to the other forum states and if a textually rooted congressional
policy demands that a uniform federal rule be applied. Section 1407 itself, with its call
for the just and efficient resolution of multidistrict cases, may be considered evidence of
congressional demand for application of a uniform federal rule. We must not lose sight,
however, of the fact that § 1407 explicitly provides for consolidation of pretrial proceedings only. Thus, it is slender authority for developing uniform rules for substantive law
to be applied in plenary trial proceedings. See also Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HAv. L. REv. 881, 927-30 (1986) (author proposes that "the
primary limit on [judicial] power to make federal common law [should be] that there
must be a source of authority for any given federal common law rule," id. at 928, such as
a constitutional or statutory enactment other than the diversity jurisdiction grant or
Rules of Decision Act, id.).
Analysis of the choice of law problems involved in consolidated and class actions
based on diversity jurisdiction should include consideration of the implications of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). In Shutts the Supreme Court held
that in a nationwide class action Kansas state courts improperly applied Kansas law to
all of the underlying class members' claims. The Court reasoned that due process and
full faith and credit principles forbade Kansas to apply its law unless it had substantial
state interests, which would be indicated by significant contacts or an aggregate of contacts with the underlying transactions, that made the application of its law reasonable.
In the absence of such contacts the application of Kansas law would be arbitrary and
capricious. Id. at 821-22.
The implications of this holding on the choice of law question for federal court consolidated or class actions based on diversity jurisdiction are unclear. Although the participants in this Symposium debated the impact of Shutts on the Klaxon rule, see supra
pp. 554-58, many questions remain: (1) Does Shutts limit the ability of the district court
to apply a common substantive law rule? (2) Would due process standards preclude a
federal court from applying the law of a single state to all claims in a consolidated or
class action when some of those claims lack substantial contacts with the state whose law
the court seeks to apply? (3) Would the inability to apply a uniform standard to all of
the claims in a class action make it difficult, if not impossible, to meet the common
questions requirement that lies at the heart of FED. R. Civ. P. 23? (4) Could Congress,
under the Commerce Clause power, legislate a choice of law rule that would govern all
claims in such a consolidated or class action if interstate transactions were involved? See
Field, supra, at 913-15 (analyzing the choice of law difficulties confronted by the Seventh
Circuit in Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
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tive law is not possible, the resulting babel of state laws applicable to the various claims might wipe out the efficiency and
economy normally expected to result from consolidation. The
question also arises whether traditional diversity case venue
standards 2 should govern cases consolidated for full trial purposes. Narrow interpretation of these standards might make
consolidation potentially impossible because of the difficulty of
finding any one district in which all plaintiffs reside, all defendants reside, or all the claims arise.
Carried to the most grandiose extreme, the transfer of numerous widespread cases, possessing common questions of fact,
into one district for coordinated discovery or plenary trial purposes might involve the joinder of claims initiated in state as
well as federal court. Such a procedure, however, raises significant constitutional questions concerning the propriety of such a
maneuver under our dual sovereignty system.2 7 Concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction permit a substantial claim that
independently meets federal jurisdictional requirements to carry
into court with it other claims that do not meet such standards
by themselves if the supported and supporting claims arise from
a common nucleus of operative fact. 28 Despite the advantages
from the standpoint of judicial economy and convenience that
such consolidation brings, it runs the risk of federal usurpation
of state power to adjudicate nonfederal, nondiverse claims. This
risk is especially great when pendent or ancillary jurisdiction is
used to bring in new parties as well as new claims. The Supreme
Court clearly has shown in Aldinger v. Howard" and Owen
Equipment and Erection Co. v. Krogerso that it is reluctant to
approve such support jurisdiction in the face of even a hint of
congressional opposition. Thus, any such mass joinder device

978 (1975), and the court's decision to apply the federal law of contribution and indemnity because the federal government was a party and had a predominant and almost
exclusive interest in regulating the nation's airways); Comment, Choice of Law and the
Multistate Class: Forum Interests in Matters Distant, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1986)
(discussing, among other things, the impact of Shutts on class action litigation).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982).
27. See Wright, supra p. 555 (discussing cases construing whether the Anti-Injunction Act is a bar against a federal court enjoining state court proceedings in the context
of mass litigation).
28. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
29. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
30. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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would have to be approved by statute rather than a mere rule of
court. When these state-federal relations difficulties are added
to the loss of individual litigant autonomy that mass joinder devices bring, it is less clear that the judicial economy arguments
in favor of such techniques should carry the day. Nevertherless,
the increased volume of litigation remains, and the inertial force
toward the mass joinder grows inexorable.
In addition to those mass joinder devices, we also have suggestions for expanded use or continued use of the class action
procedure. This is a procedure that many plaintiff's attorneys
see the necessity of continuing to use because it affords a mechanism for putting under one litigation umbrella a large variety of
claimants who have common questions of law or fact that can be
litigated more efficiently in unison than in separate litigation. It
is almost a foregone conclusion that some degree of increase in
class actions may be necessary. At the same time, however, we
have to realize the great variety of problems that flow in the
wake of the class action. Choice of law problems similar to those
in the multidistrict transfer of venue cases may arise. In addition, the certification process in class actions seems to have developed a life of its own. Class certification proceedings have developed into monsters that sometimes take longer than the main
case. 1 Courts spend vast amounts of time in determining
whether a case is manageable, whether there are common questions of law or fact, whether the class representatives are typical
of the class, and how to handle various conflicts of interest
within the class.3 2 Additionally, we still have an ambivalent feeling toward class actions.3 3 On the one hand, we look at them as a
mass litigation device for the little man of society who cannot
afford to litigate matters individually. On the other hand, critics
view class actions as engines of the devil whereby cases seeking
huge recoveries are brought against worthy corporations that are
unable to pay massive damages. Such critics look at class actions

31. For a discussion of the requirements for bringing a class action, see R. MCCUL& J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 10, at 246-75. For a discussion of certification
problems in frequently litigated cases, see Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in
Title VII Suits, 99 HARv. L. REv. 619 (1986), and Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 487 (1985).
32. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), construed in
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
33. See, e.g., 1 H. NEWBERG, NEWBERO ON CLASS ACTIONs 2 & n.4 (2d ed. 1985).
LOUGH

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
South
Carolina
Law Review,
38, Iss. 3 [2020], Art.[Vol.
12

38

as devices for stirring up litigation that otherwise would not be
brought. This ambivalent attitude must be resolved if greater
use of the class action device is to occur.
We need to reexamine class action procedure to determine
the correctness of the balance drawn between the need for an
efficient collective litigation device and the due process needs of
the individual litigant. The difficulty in balancing the two needs
is especially acute in rule 23(b)(3) class actions34 in which class
members are bound together only by a loose alliance based only
on common questions of law or fact. Perhaps class representation in such actions is inherently inadequate. Are there means of
insuring absent member monitoring of class representative stewardship without losing the benefits of efficiency flowing from
combined litigation? Moreover, the notice requirements of rule
23(c)(2), 35 that personal notice be sent to reasonably identifiable
class members informing them of the nature of the action, of
their right to participate, and of their right to opt out or to remain in the case and be bound by the judgment, should be reexamined. Are these requirements so stringent that they discourage consumer class actions,38 or are they inadequate as a means
of truly informing absent members that significant events affecting their interests are taking place in a sometimes distant
courtroom?
An alternative to class actions as a mass joinder device may
be the interpleader procedure. Interpleader has not been the
most popular mass litigation device because the proliferation of
various rules and types of interpleader discourages litigants and
attorneys from using this procedure. There is statutory interpleader and rule interpleader; each has entirely different sets of
jurisdictional standards, which leads to a great deal of confusion.37 Until the confusion is alleviated, we probably will not see
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
36. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see also Weiner, The Class
Action, the Federal Court and the Upper Class: Is Notice, and Its Consequent Cost,
Really Necessary?, 22 CAL. W.L. REV. 31 (1985). Weiner argues that notice of pendency
of the action should be dispensed with even in actions of the rule 23(b)(3) variety. In his
view, fairness to absent class members is more dependent on the adequacy of class representation than a notice that often has little impact.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) (statutory interpleader standards); FED. R. Civ. P. 22
("rule interpleader" provisions). For a comparison of the two types of interpleader, see
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 528 n.3 (1967).
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an increase in use of the interpleader device. It does afford some
advantages, however, particularly in statutory interpleader, that
make it attractive as a mass litigation device: it offers nationwide service of process and an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act,3" thus permitting the consolidation of cases from state
courts as well as federal courts. 39 Those are advantages that
should not be dismissed lightly.
Increased use of mass joinder devices deserves the most serious attention. Any thorough cost-benefit analysis, however,
must give considerable weight to the impersonal quality that
might then pervade our judicial system. Individual litigants,
even in cases with opt-out provisions, might feel themselves
swept into mass movements over which they have little control.
A lawyer's control over his case would be diluted as lead and
liaison counsel take over. Litigation might tend to concentrate in
major judicial centers less convenient than nearby courthouses.
Multidistrict case transfer, class actions, and interpleader
are joinder devices that could be expanded by statute or rule to
help alleviate our mass litigation problems. In addition to those
techniques, courts by case law could expand key doctrines that
have served as barriers to promiscuous litigation. In section 1983
actions, the courts could develop stricter immunities doctrines in
damages actions brought against officials. The development of
absolute immunity doctrines for judges and those acting in semijudicial capacities, the tighter use of qualified immunity for executive officials so that they are less likely to be subjected to
prolonged litigation, and the encouragement of summary judgments have all pervaded recent Supreme Court decisions in the
civil rights area. 40 This expanded availability of immunity de-

38. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1982)."
39. It should be noted, though, that in State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court held that the power of a district court to enjoin another
proceeding to protect interpleader jurisdiction is limited to instances when such other
action threatens the stake that is the object of the interpleader proceeding. Id. at 533-37.

40. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (strengthening the qualified immunity of most executive officials); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (affirming the absolute immunity of judges acting within
their jurisdiction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 324 U.S. 409 (1976) (discussing broad immunity
for prosecutors acting in a quasi-judicial capacity). But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that local government bodies are not entitled to the
qualified immunity against suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) that most government

officials would have); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW
[Vol. 38
South
Carolina
Law Review,
38, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 12

fenses to officials confronted by civil rights claims may reduce

the volume of section 1983 actions. I would interject a note of
caution, however, and ask whether the evolution of the immunities doctrines has gone rampant to the point where many proper
claims are not receiving redress in the only way they can be fully
redressed and that is through a court damages action.
We also see the courts getting more strict, belatedly so, but
finally getting more strict, in their application of basic constitutional jurisdictional standards such as the article III case or controversy doctrine. After a strong flirtation in the late sixties with
a broad concept of taxpayer standing, 4 ' the Supreme Court in
recent times has been rejecting claims of taxpayer standing with
a niggling hypertechnical fervor.42 The Court now insists that
the plaintiff seeking taxpayer standing be attacking a congressional enactment rather than executive action and that the statute have a primarily fiscal rather than regulatory impact. The
basis of the attack must be a governmental violation of a constitutional provision specifically designed to limit taxing and
spending. Thus, the potentially broad concept of taxpayer
standing has been narrowed to just a window of opportunity for
the litigant. Loose interpretations of the case or controversy doc(1978) (holding that some local subdivisions of states are subject to suit under § 1983 for
injuries caused by entity policy). The line of cases affirming or broadening official immunity would tend to discourage suits, but the line increasing the vulnerability of entities to
suit would tend to encourage litigation. Perhaps one line cancels out the other as far as
impact on the federal court workload is concerned.
41. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
42. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974); cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1973) (held
that allegation of congressional nonobservance of Incompatibility Clause implicated only
the generalized interest of all citizens and was not a concrete injury as required by case
or controversy doctrine). But see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (sufficient actual injury found when environmental organization claimed failure of Interstate Commerce Commission to suspend railroad
rate increase would cause economic, recreational, and aesthetic harm to members of organization because rate increase would discourage use of recyclable materials and encourage use of raw materials from environment).
For discussions of the Supreme Court's approach in recent taxpayer standing cases,
see Note, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General Standing Principles:The
Road Not Taken, 63 B.U.L. REv. 717 (1983), and Nichol, Standing on the Constitution,
The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798 (1983). For probing critiques
of the general direction of standing, see Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALiF. L. Rv.
68 (1984), and Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separationof Powers Analysis, 1984
Wis L. REv. 37.
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trine persist in some emotion-laden areas of law, such as civil
rights. In order to avoid dismissal because of mootness, cases
normally must be live and viable at each stage court action is
requested. In areas in which public pressure for court resolution
of visceral issues is great, such as cases litigating the right to an
abortion, courts may relax these standards to permit technically
moot cases to proceed if they involve fundamental issues that
might arise again and might not otherwise receive appellate review. 43 The general drift of recent case law, however, has been
toward erecting higher jurisdictional hurdles for suits challenging governmental actions.," Litigants are more and more being
relegated to political remedies at the ballot box. The question
that again presents itself, as it did in the immunities context, is
whether in carrying out this generally laudable purpose of reducing the volume of litigation, courts are, through tight interpretations of the case or controversy doctrine, discouraging very
useful forms of litigation that hold governmental feet to the fire
in a pointed way that cannot be matched simply by voting in an
election in which the issues with which you are concerned are
buried in a multitude of political controversies.
Are there additional workload control devices that could be
considered? For example, a frequent refrain sung by those who
want to stem the flow of cases into the federal courts is that the
jurisdictional amount requirement should be raised.45 My impression is that it does not seem to make a great deal of difference what the jurisdictional amount is. 46 Litigators would find
some means of pleading to satisfy the higher amount. It might
be useful, however, to consider raising the jurisdictional amount
for selected categories of cases that might be particularly appro-

43. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that an element of establishing standing in suits against local government entities to stop alleged infringement of

constitutional rights is to convincingly plead a substantial causal connection between the
plaintiff's injuries and the governmental action). But cf. Lay, Comments on the Volume

of Litigation in the Federal Courts, 8 DEL. J. CoRp. LAW 435, 439-40 (1983) (noting that
indulgent interpretations of the case or controversy doctrine have increased the federal

court workload).
45. 14A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 16, § 3701, at 11.
46. Chief Justice Warren concluded that the 1958 increase in the jurisdictional
amount to in excess of $10,000 did little to reduce the flow of cases into federal courts.
Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Am. Law Inst. Annual Meeting (May 18, 1960),
reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 213, 213 (1960).
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priate for state court adjudication because of a strong state interest in trying such disputes or because of the tendency of litigants to resort promiscuously to federal court as a ploy to
persuade the opposition to settle.47
The growing volume and complexity of litigation in the federal courts may be attacked not merely by limiting access to the
courts or by developing mass joinder devices such as the class
action, but also by the more efficient use of judicial personnel.
Progress has been made in recent years through the development of a stronger system of federal magistrates whereby courts
can turn over more pretrial discovery to judges who may not
have the status of judges exercising the complete range of article
III judicial power, but who are highly trained, very professional,
and very competent. 8 One of the problems this trend generates,
however, is that increased reliance upon judges with less than
full decisionmaking powers splinters the litigation process. Consequently, the danger exists that nobody truly gets a comprehensive view of the litigation. Additionally, some litigants have
raised the question of whether decisions by magistrates, who are
not article III judges with lifetime tenure and Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, provide the kind of justice
that the framers of the Constitution had in mind.4 9 Can a judge

47. Cases under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), must involve at least $50,000 in dispute,
measured by all the claims in the suit. 15 U.S.C. § 2310. This provides a federal cause of
action, but discourages promiscuous resort to federal courts.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 638 (1982). For a discussion of the role of federal magistrates,
see J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 8, at 271-82.
49. The Ninth Circuit has debated the constitutionality of provisions of the Federal
Magistrates Act that permit the magistrate to conduct civil trials upon consent of the
parties and that permit direct review of such proceedings by the court of appeals, bypassing the district court, if the parties so stipulate. In Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v.
Instomedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983), a panel of the circuit struck the civil trial
provision as unconstitutional. The panel pointed out that in contrast to article III judges,
magistrates serve eight year terms, must retire at age seventy, have no protected salary,
and may be removed for various reasons. An en banc assembly of the Ninth Circuit
reversed and upheld consensual referrals to magistrates for civil trial. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir. 1984). The en banc court
held that sufficient article III judge control over the proceedings was retained because a
district judge was able to cancel a reference to a magistrate upon a showing of good
cause. The court observed, however, that careful scrutiny by the district court should be
maintained to insure that the party's consent to magisterial trial is truly voluntary. See
J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 8, at 277-78.
Any analysis of the legitimacy of the commitment of extensive judicial power to
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who is appointed by other judges, who has less security of salary
than an article III judge, and who serves an eight year term, dispense impartial justice? Federal magistrates seem to be conducting the tasks entrusted to them in a fair, forthright manner.
In so doing, they relieve the district judges of many of the worrisome details of processing cases, especially in the pretrial phase.
This gives the district judge more time to devote to his role as
the independent article III adjudicator.
These are some of the workload control devices that can
have an impact particularly upon the trial court level. Now, let
us look at the appellate courts by first examining the courts of
appeals and then the Supreme Court.
III.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE COURTS OF APPEALS

The courts of appeals have not been immune to the growing
volume and complexity of litigation confronting the trial courts.
Many proposals for more coherently managing increasingly unwieldy appellate dockets have been made.
These proposals include suggestions for dealing with the
growing number of conflicting decisions that have arisen among
the circuits. Other suggestions seek to solve the alleged inability
of judges who lack specialized training to deal with very technical types of litigation, such as some of the more esoteric varieties
of tax cases. Dean Griswold has urged the creation of topical
courts of appeals.5 0 Each would have jurisdiction focusing on a

judges not possessing article III independence and security must focus on Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In that case the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional portions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 that gave broad powers to bankruptcy judges to adjudicate civil proceedings arising
out of or related to the bankruptcy. The Court recognized that separation of powers
considerations dictate that the legislative and executive branches be permitted to create
courts with judges possessing less than full article III security, but only in areas in which
the political branches had been given extraordinary substantive power. The Court found
that these include areas dealing with federal territories, military courts-martial, and the
adjudication of public rights, which the Court left undefined stating only that at a minimum a matter of public right must arise between the government and other parties, as
distinguished from controversies that are solely between private parties. Id. at 64-70.
The Court held, however, that bankruptcy was not an area in which the political
branches could claim such extraordinary substantive power. Id. at 71-72.
For a general discussion of the aforementioned issues, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 5,
at 50-51.
50. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 66.
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cluster of technical statutory construction problems. Several
such courts are already operating successfully. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which focuses upon the problems
of patent law, claims against the government, and problems of
international trade, 51 and the Court of Military Appeals, which
reviews courts-martial, 52 are but two examples. These courts
have very successfully developed coherent bodies of law in what
might have been areas of conflict amongst various circuits.
Advocates of appellate reform have suggested extending the
system of specialized appeals courts to areas such as tax, antitrust, or complex commercial problems.53 Some have urged the
creation of a special panel to deal with appeals of federal law
issues involved in criminal convictions in either the state or federal court systems.5 Others have suggested caution in adopting
such solutions. Judge Wilkinson pointed out that judges on specialized courts tend to get a more narrow view divorced from the
general stream of development of the law. Another objection
voiced by Judge Wilkinson is that a specialized court might be
subjected to pressure from political groups that try to capture
control of the process of appointing its judges. 5 A complex system in which specialized courts of appeals coexist with general

51. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982). See generally Meador, American Courts in the Bicentennial Decade and Beyond, 55 Miss. L.J. 1, 15 (1985); Comment, An Appraisal of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 301, 305-24 (1984).
52. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982). See generally Willis, The Constitution, the United
States Court of Military Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REV. 27 (1972) (author

discusses the court's treatment of constitutional issues and suggests ways to enhance
court's status as civilian overseer of military justice system); Willis, The United States
Court of Military Appeals: Its Origins, Operationand Future, 55 Mm. L. REv. 39 (1972)

(author discusses the creation and growth of the court).
53. See Griswold, supra note 15, at 66; see also Handler, What to Do with the Supreme Court's Burgeoning Calendars?,5 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 274-75 (1984) (advocating
a specialized court for tax appeals, but remaining noncommital for specialized courts in

other areas of law).
54. E.g., Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal

Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 604 (1973).
55. See Wilkinson, supra p. 442. Some scholars would point to the old Commerce
Court, a specialized tribunal created to review decisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, as evidence of the vulnerability of courts with jurisdictions focusing largely

on cases involving powerful interest groups to pressure from such groups. The court was
abolished after a barrage of charges that it was prejudiced in favor of the railroads and
against the public. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME

COURT 153-74 (1928); Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional
Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 238 (1964).
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subject matter, regional appellate courts, presents a variety of
jurisdictional problems such as whether a case belongs in a specialized or regional court of appeals and, if the case does belong
in a specialized court, in which technical court does a case affecting several specialties belong.
My own reaction to this conflict is that a modest increase in
the categories of cases handled by specialized courts of appeals
would be useful. If we were to develop a large menagerie of limited subject matter courts of appeals dealing with various areas
of the law, we would have to develop a whole new jurisprudence
of traffic management between these various courts of appeals. A
cautious increase in the number of topical courts of appeals and
the cases handled by them, however, would be useful, and the
tax area would seem to be the area most logical for careful
consideration.
The volume of work has forced courts of appeals increasingly to rely upon abbreviated procedures such as deciding cases
without the benefit of oral argument and without giving guidance to prospective litigants through complete, written opinions.56 Scholars and judges have been debating means to halt
this drift toward increased use of summary disposition techniques. Earlier in this Symposium, Dean Carrington discussed
devices for reinstituting plenary appeals with full opinions, full
arguments, and careful consideration by judges who have a
chance to read the entire transcript.57 One suggestion would create a new tier between the district courts and the courts of appeals that would be composed of district judges from the vicinity
from which the appeal arose. This court would be able to give
plenary consideration to matters on appeal. This proposal generated a good bit of interest and controversy among Symposium
participants. The main objections voiced against the proposal
are that it would introduce yet another layer into the federal
litigation process, further delaying the ultimate, resolution of
cases, and it would make even more speculative any attempt to

56. See generally Address by Myron H. Bright, Am. Bar Ass'n Tax Inst. (Apr. 5,
1974), reprintedin The Changing Nature of the FederalAppeals Process in the 1970's,
65 F.R.D. 496, 499-501 (1975) (discussing efforts to streamline internal operating procedures of courts of appeals); Lay, supra note 12, at 1064.
57. See Carrington, supra pp. 431-33. For a compilation of state systems that have
used trial judges in appellate capacities, see Hufstedler, ConstitutionalRevision and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. REv. 577, 595 (1969).
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predict which cases would be accepted for review.5 8 A new set of
jurisdictional rules for determining which cases would go to the
new panels and which would go to the regular courts of appeals
would have to be developed. The multistate perspective that
emanates from the courts of appeals as they now exist would be
lost. The proposal, however, should not be dismissed out of
hand. It has some virtue in categories of cases in which the issues on appeal are dominated to a considerable degree by state
law. In this context, it may make sense to have district judges
from the local area, who presumably are more familiar with the
state law, act as a first tier of appeals.
Dean Carrington invited us to debate whether the system of
mandatory review of district court civil cases by the courts of
appeals should be abolished. 59 This would mean that a litigant
would no longer have an appeal of right, but would have to file
something akin to a petition for writ of certiorari with the courts
of appeals. Many will criticize such a development as one likely
to increase the element of chance in determining which decisions
are reviewed. The present system under which courts of appeals
sit in three-member panels creates a climate of arbitrariness in
which it is hazardous for even the most skilled clairvoyant to
predict what judges will sit on a given panel, or, when intracircuit conflict exists, what law the panel will consider binding. If
you add to this problem the loss of mandatory review in civil
cases, the ability of counsel to advise clients on the likely course
of litigation and the ability of courts of appeals to enforce precedent would be further eroded. Despite these concerns, workload
pressure may force the abolition of mandatory appeals.
Another factor that should be considered in examining the
workload of the courts of appeals is whether courts are interpreting interlocutory appeal statutes too loosely. Generally, trial
court determinations must be final and plenary before appeal
can take place.6 0 Nonfinal decisions can be appealed, however, in
cases dealing with a grant or denial of injunctions.6 1 Interloculatory appeals may be filed in multiple claims cases when adjudication of one claim is completed prior to the rest of the case,

58.
59.
60.
61.

See Bator, supra p. 451.
See Carrington, supra pp. 429-31.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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and the judge issues a certificate authorizing immediate appeal.62 The judge may also certify interlocutory appeal of controlling issues of law when a genuine controversy exists if an
early determination might speed resolution of the rest of the
case.6 3 Are those rules being interpreted too loosely, too strictly,
64

or in conformity with the drafters' intent?
IV.

PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court sits at the apex of the federal judicial
system. It must not only provide direction in managing the
mounting workload of the federal courts as a whole, but the
Court also must confront a flood of cases awash against its own
doors. Considerable attention has been given to proposals to reduce this workload. One of the suggestions is the abolition of the
remaining categories of mandatory appeals, thus leaving the
Court's docket entirely discretionary. In his confirmation hearings for Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the
members of the Supreme Court supported with near unanimity
the abolition of mandatory appeals.8 5
Serious study should be given to the wisdom of the
mandatory and direct appeals systems. Currently, the Supreme
Court's mandatory jurisdiction covers cases in which the state
court of last resort strikes down a federal statute as unconstitutional or upholds a state statute against allegations that it is invalid under federal law, 6 and cases in which the federal courts
of appeals strike down state laws as unconstitutional.8 7 Direct

appeal to the Supreme Court from district court decisions lies

62. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1
(1980) (liberally interpreting the rule 54(b) standards for permitting the court in a multiple claims case to certify as final for appeal purposes one or more but fewer than all of
the claims if there is no just reason to delay).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (Supp. III 1985). Compare Hadjipatiras v. Pacifica, 290 F.2d
697, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1961) with Alabama Labor Council v. Alabama, 453 F.2d 922, 924
(5th Cir. 1972) and Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1970) (discussing
strict and liberal approaches to interpreting § 1292(b)).
64. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 715.
65. See Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 272-73 (1986) [hereinafter Rehnquist Hearings] (testimony of Justice William Rehnquist).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982).
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when a three-judge panel renders a decision granting or denying
an injunction, 68 or when a district court holds an act of Congress
unconstitutional in any action in which the federal government
is a party."' Mandatory appeals from the courts of appeals force
the Supreme Court to consider cases that may not be of sufficient intrinsic importance to justify high court review. Also, the
obligatory jurisdiction may result in the Supreme Court's deciding a controversial point of public policy before the Court has
had adequate time to consider the consequences of the various
options. Direct appeals from the district court to the Supreme
Court may speed the resolution of important issues, but they
leave the Supreme Court without the benefit of consideration by
the courts of appeals. The abolition of direct and mandatory appeals may be a partial solution to the Court's workload
problems. We should keep in mind, however, that this approach
could create new problems. The Court may spend more and
more of its time determining what cases it should take. At some
creating more of a workload
point, this might ultimately end 7up
0
problem rather than reducing it.
Abolition of the remnants of mandatory appeals will not by
itself reduce the Supreme Court's workload to manageable proportions. Many have proposed more fundamental structural alterations. Prominent among these suggestions are proposals to
increase the nationwide appellate capacity by establishing an intermediate appellate tribunal between the regional circuit courts
of appeals and the Supreme Court. A committee established by
the Federal Judicial Center, chaired by Professor Paul Freund of
Harvard, offered the ice-breaking proposal in this debate. This
blue ribbon panel suggested that a National Court of Appeals be
created to perform two basic functions: to serve as a screening
device to select the cases most worthy of Supreme Court consideration and to decide cases involving intercircuit conflict, especially in the interpretation of federal statutory law.7 1 The first

68. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982). For example, when a three-judge panel is convened to

hear a challenge to an apportionment scheme for congressional or statewide legislative
districts, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), direct appeal to the Supreme

Court is permitted from orders granting or denying injunctive relief.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).

70. See Freund, Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court, 66
(1983).
71.

JUDICATURE
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https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss3/12

394, 398

COURT,

57

24

AConclusions
KALEIDOSCOPIC
585 Conf
VIEW View of the Problems
1987]
Underwood: Summary and
A Kaleidoscopic

role suggested for the intermediate tribunal has proven to be the
most controversial. The Freund Committee recommended that
all cases in the Supreme Court's jurisdiction be filed initially
with the National Court of Appeals. That body then would have
had the power to deny review entirely, to transmit the case to
the Supreme Court for consideration, or to retain the case for its
own decision in order to resolve intercircuit conflicts that are
significant, but not worthy of Supreme Court review. All denials
of review would have been final. The Supreme Court would have
considered only the cases transmitted to it by the National
Court of Appeals and would grant certiorari to those cases it
wished to hear. The National Court of Appeals would have been
staffed by judges already sitting on federal appellate courts who
would have been drawn from the regional circuit bodies by an
automatic rotation system.
Critics claimed the grant of the screening function to the
National Court of Appeals was surgery far too radical for the
malady it was designed to cure. Justice Brennan argued that this
function touched the very core of the Supreme Court's ability to
monitor the direction of federal law and insure that civil rights
were protected.7 2 He vigorously insisted that this was a function
that should not be delegated because article III provides for one
Supreme Court. The delegation of the power to screen cases to a
court that could deny Supreme Court review without recourse
could be interpreted as creating a dual high court system.
A few years later another distinguished panel composed of
members appointed by the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice, and the President also recommended the
creation of a National Court of Appeals. This commission,
chaired by Senator Roman Hruska, called for an intermediate
court of more modest jurisdiction: it would not have performed
the screening function.73 Cases proceeding beyond the regional
court of appeals and state supreme court levels would have been
filed initially with the Supreme Court. The Court would have
F.R.D. 573, 590 (1972).
72. Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv.
473, 480 (1973); see also Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload,

66

JUDICATURE 230, 233 (1983).
73. See COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE

AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE,
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had the option of retaining the case for decision on the merits,
of denying all review, of denying certiorari and referring the case
to the National Court of Appeals for decision on the merits, or
of giving the National Court of Appeals the choice of retaining
the case for decision or denying review. 74 Judges were to be selected in the traditional way: appointment by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The system of selecting
judges as envisioned by the Freund Report, from the regional
courts of appeals by an automatic rotation method, was constitutionally suspect because these judges would have been occupying a new office for which they had not been selected by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Recently Chief Justice Burger proposed that an intercircuit
panel be created as a new tier between the regional courts of
appeals and the Supreme Court. 75 It would be created for a temporary experimentation period of five years. The panel's function would be to resolve cases referred to it by the Supreme
Court. These cases primarily would involve conflicts among the
circuits in the interpretation of federal law, particularly statutory law. It would be staffed by judges drawn from the regional
courts of appeals who would be selected by the Chief Justice or
by the Supreme Court. Such a selection method would remove'a
political obstacle to the creation of the new court that would exist if an arguably partisan political figure, the President, had
power to appoint all of the members of the new court at one
time. A political party would be reluctant to concede such power
to the leader of the opposition camp.
Appointment by the Chief Justice or Supreme Court would
appear to be less partisan. Such a selection method, however,
might clash with the Appointments Clause requirement that
judges be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Chief Justice does already select judges

74. Id. at 239. In addition to having jurisdiction over cases referred to it by the
Supreme Court, the National Court of Appeals proposed by the Hruska Commission
would have had jurisdiction over cases transferred to it by circuit courts of appeals in
which a circuit court decided that a prompt definitive determination was needed by a
court of nationally binding stature, or that a need for resolution of an intercircuit conflict
existed. Id. at 241-42.
75. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Am. Bar Ass'n Midyear Meeting
(Feb. 13, 1985), reprintedin The Time Is Now for the IntercircuitPanel, 71 A.BA J. 86
(1985).
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for courts, such as the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,"6 from
among sitting judges. These positions, however, are logical extensions of the judges' main jobs. Service on the intercircuit
panel would be a major new office, even though a temporary one.
Appointment by the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court would
concentrate too much power in one person or one small group.
Chief Justice Rehnquist opposes selection by the Supreme Court
or Chief Justice. He also opposes allowing each circuit court to
elect a representative to sit on the intercircuit panel. He argued
that the court would end up "like the United Nations [with
judges] primarily loyal to where they came from rather than to
where they are coming to."7 8s He contended that the judges
should be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 9 This route is politically hazardous, but it is
the safest constitutionally. The basic thrust of Chief Justice
Burger's proposals is sound. An intercircuit panel that does not
perform the screening function but focuses on resolving conflicts
in statutory construction should be established on a temporary
experimental basis.
Fundamental structural changes are not the only means to
address the Supreme Court's workload problems. Together with
the proposals for the development of a national court of appeals
and proposals for the abolition of the Supreme Court's
mandatory appellate docket, increased attention is being devoted to whether some of the internal rules of the Supreme
Court should be altered. Should the Rule of Four be changed so
that certiorari would be granted only if five Justices vote affirmatively?80 This might reduce the ultimate number of cases that
the Court has to address for final decision, but it could actually
increase the contention and debate with regard to what cases
should receive a grant of certiorari. One wonders whether that is

76. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1982).
77. See Rehnquist Hearings, supra note 65, at 174, 273, 368-69. Dix, in his account

of the demise of the Commerce Court, notes that selection of the court's judges by the
Chief Justice from among members of the federal judiciary contributed to the public
perception of the court as an administrative body, rather than an entity deserving the
respect accorded the federal judiciary. See Dix, supra note 55, at 255.
78. Rehnquist Hearings, supra note 65, at 273.
79. Id.
80. See Handler, supra note 53, at 269. Handler notes that Justice Stevens, in a
1982 speech, advocated that the Rule of Four be changed to a Rule of Five. Id.
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in fact a solution or the creation of a new problem.
In addition to the above suggestions designed to deal directly with the workload of the federal courts, alterations have
occurred in the relationship between the federal and state court
systems, which, although not intended primarily to be workload
control devices, could have a significant impact on the volume of
federal litigation. Cases that at one time composed staples of
federal jurisdiction have lately been diverted to state courts. We
now have fairly clear holdings that section 1983 actions can be
brought in state courts as well as in federal tribunals,"' and the
Supreme Court has encouraged litigants, through its development of new claim preclusion principles, to bring federal civil
rights claims in a state forum when state claims involving the
same injury or series of events are brought in state courts.2
Also, the Court recently has reduced the scope of habeas corpus
review by federal courts of state court criminal case decisions. In
Stone v. Powell8 3 the Court decided that when a state forum has
provided an opportunity for a full and fair hearing of defense
arguments that fourth amendment search and seizure standards
have been violated, those contentions normally are not subject
to habeas corpus review.
In closing, let me note that the keystone of the handling of
the workload and the keystone of the preservation of the role of
the federal courts in the judicial review system is a responsible
independent judiciary with adequate salary, tenure during good

81. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 283-84 n.7 (1980).
82. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
83. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986)
(claims of sixth amendment right to effective counsel are subject to habeas corpus review). The Supreme Court reached this result despite the fact that the defendant's allegations of ineffective counsel largely were based on failure to make a motion to suppress
evidence supposedly seized in violation of fourth amendment standards. The Court was
influenced by the fact that often the first practical opportunity to raise ineffectiveness of
counsel arguments is in habeas proceedings. Unlike the exclusionary rule involved in
Stone, which the Court dismissed as largely a judge-made construct, the right to counsel
is based directly on the Constitution and more often may deserve a federal habeas airing.
The general trend, however, seems to be to discourage federal habeas review. For
example, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Court showed itself more willing to let violations of state procedural rules, such as a failure without good cause to
make contemporaneous objection to a confession, serve as separate and independent

state law bases for decisions against criminal defendants, thus blocking federal habeas
review because no federal legal issues were implicated in the state court decision.
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behavior, and a posture of independence and impartiality. Is
there an Achilles' heel that makes the Supreme Court vulnerable
to jurisdictional raids that threaten the Court's role as impartial
arbiter of the constitutional system? In article III, section 2 the
Constitution permits Congress to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 4 Some would construe
this to mean that major deletions from the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, deletions perhaps even of entire categories of cases, would be proper. If Congress begins to take broad
sweeping categories of cases, such as school prayer, busing, and
abortion, out of the hands of the Supreme Court, it begins to
tamper with judicial independence.8 5 We need not only to insure
the competence of the federal court system to manage its increasing workload, but also to insure that the courts can discharge their work in a way that maintains the aura of independence and impartiality that we have come to rely on as a key
trait of the federal court system.
The Reconstruction Era case, Ex parte McCardle,s8 permitted a newly passed statute to frustrate Supreme Court review of
a federal circuit court decision rendered pursuant to a habeas
corpus petition challenging incarceration of a civilian by a military tribunal. The Supreme Court acknowledged the power of
Congress to create exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction it otherwise would have over cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States. 7 Those wishing to
stymie Supreme Court consideration of sensitive controversial
civil rights decisions may seize upon this part of the decision.
Heed should be given, however, to the closing words of the decision. The Court indicated that Congress was merely taking back
the expanded, streamlined, habeas corpus appeal jurisdiction it
had granted to the Supreme Court in a recent statute and was
not abolishing preexisting channels for reviewing such issues.8 8
This conclusion was affirmed shortly thereafter in Ex parte Yer-

84. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
85. For examples of recent unsuccessful efforts to enact congressional controls over
jurisdiction of federal courts, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 38 (3d ed. 1986), and 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 16, § 3525, at 22425.
86. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
87. Id. at 512-15.
88. Id. at 515.
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ger.819 Perhaps those cases can be interpreted to mean that Congress can alter the modes of appeal, but cannot totally block review of key constitutional cases by the Supreme Court.
Professor Goebel, a leading scholar of the formative era of
the federal constitution, has suggested that article III, section 2
never was intended to give Congress the power to delete significant categories of constitutional issues from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but only to grant Congress power
to superintend federal appeals in a manner similar to that exercised by state legislatures in the late eighteenth century in regulating state court appellate proceedings.9 0 Such state court powers were, in his view, largely limited to regulating housekeeping
details and setting the technical mode of appeal, and did not
encompass a power to block consideration of fundamental substantive issues.9 1
The congressional maneuver in Ex parte McCardle was
designed to and succeeded in controlling the outcome of a particular case already in the jurisdictional bosom of the Supreme
Court. In United States v. Klein,e2 a case decided only two years
after McCardle, the Supreme Court had second thoughts about
the breadth of its concession of power to Congress. The Court
held that Congress could not, under the guise of passing legislation controlling jurisdiction, enact rules dictating precisely the
weighing and balancing process a court goes through in reaching
a decision if this results in Congress predetermining the outcome
of a case or a category of cases. The Klein decision is more in
keeping with the narrow view of Congress' article III, section 2
powers later espoused by Goebel. Tenure during good behavior,
security of salary, and other safeguards of judicial independence
would be meaningless, hollow gestures if the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court could be manipulated by the temporarily powerful to banish unpopular decisions.

89. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
90. 1 J. GOEBEL, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, THE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 240 (1971); see
also Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction:HistoricalBasis, 47
MINN, L. REV. 53 (1962).
91. 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note 90, at 240.
92. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). For a general discussion of Klein, see Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v.
Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1189.
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Shortly after his retirement from the bench, Justice Owen
Roberts strongly urged that the portion of article III, section 2
that seemed to permit Congress to remove categories of cases
from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court be excised
by constitutional amendment to plug what he considered a large
hole in the dike of Supreme Court independence.9 Such an
amendment would be a logical extension of the impartial judicial
review role the Supreme Court is expected to exercise over the
constitutionality of acts of the other branches of state, local, and
national governments, including Congress. The other side of the
argument, however, is that the potential for deletion by Congress of topics from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is, even if seldom exercised, a significant safeguard against
judicial usurpation of popular branch power. It is thus consistent with the doctrine that each branch should check and balance the powers of the others. Perhaps a middle ground might
be appropriate, one that permits Congress to exempt categories
of cases from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, but
limits the exercise of the power to occasions in which the need
for such exemption is considered extraordinary, a broad consensus is formed behind such deletion, and safeguards are included
against the precipitous passage of deletions designed to influence
particular case outcomes. This could be accomplished by an
amendment that allows Congress to exempt cases from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only by a
supermajority of three-fourths of the entire membership of each
chamber passed by two votes in two separate sessions with a
general election occurring between the two ballots, and the effective date of the deletion to be delayed so as to not govern any
case then awaiting adjudication by the Court.
Such issues of judicial independence are entitled to as much
thought and debate as our current preoccupation with workload
management tools. The growing volume and complexity of the
cases pouring into the federal trial courts, appellate courts, and
the Supreme Court pose significant problems. However, the recurring dilemma facing a democracy with a court system exercising a judicial review function in a tripartite system of government is determining the proper balance between judicial
93. See Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence,

35 A.B.A. J. 1 (1949).
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responsiveness to the popular will and independence from it.
The characteristics of the cases confronting the federal courts in
the next one hundred years will change as society and the economy change, but the propriety of this balance will remain a
source of constant debate and challenge.
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